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Chapter 8
Issues in Welfare Policy
 The incidence of poverty, as measured by the relative index customarily used in Israel, rose 
in 2005 to a level of 24.7 percent. Some reduction in poverty was evident in 2006, however, 
and in the year to June 2006 it reached 24.4 percent.
 Alternative poverty indices which consider a household poor if its income is lower than 
that required to buy a basic basket of goods, also indicate a decline in poverty in 2005, after 
rising in the previous three years.
 Forty percent of the poor manage to consume more than the amount indicated by the poverty 
line, but the high rates of poverty prevailing for years make it difficult for the weaker 
sections of the population to maintain a reasonable standard of living, so that the level of 
consumption of sixty percent of the poor, as well as their income level, is below the poverty 
line.
 The incidence of poverty is high and has risen over the years among large families, those 
with low levels of education, and families with few breadwinners, especially among Arabs 
and the ultra-orthodox (Haredi).
 Growth contributes to the reduction of poverty among those well integrated in the labor 
market, but no such effect is evident among those with low rates of participation.
 The extent of poverty is a forceful reminder of the need for an ongoing policy of reducing 
poverty, together with fiscal discipline that supports sustainable growth. The policy should 
be directed towards encouraging those capable of working to join the labor force, increasing 
the return to labor for those on low wages, and directly supporting the poor who have low 
earning power.
 At the beginning of 2007 the government decided on steps intended to narrow social gaps in 
Israel and to increase the rate of participation in the labor market. These steps included the 
introduction of earned income tax credits (EITCs), compulsory pension schemes, increased 
enforcement of labor laws, and subsidy of day centers and nurseries to enable mothers to go 
out to work. These measures are intented to be introduced gradually, by 2010.
 The health basket available to the public in Israel is generous relative to those in the 
developed countries, and it includes very expensive life-saving drugs not included in the 
baskets of those countries.
 The process of updating the basket is not based on cost–effectiveness considerations but 
purely on the medical aspect. As the resources available to the health system are limited, 
the activities of the health basket committee should be expanded to include checking the 
economic aspect as a condition for the inclusion of new medical technology in the basket.
 The basket includes hidden reserves that enable the Health Funds to provide such new 
technology that is not part of the basket.
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1. INTRODUCTION1
Poverty in Israel has reached a high level in recent years, high also by international 
comparison.2 In 2005 poverty among individuals, using the system that measures 
poverty in relative terms, continued to rise, and reached 24.7 percent.3 However, 
according to indices that reflect the ability to buy a basket of essential goods and 
services or a fixed basket of such items, poverty fell in 2005, after rising in the three 
years 2002–04 (Figure 8.1). Economic growth improved the economic condition of 
some of the poor, but to a lesser degree than that enjoyed by the rest of the population. 
As growth persisted, relative poverty also declined in the first half of 2006, by 0.6 of a 
percentage point. The high incidence of poverty over the years made it difficult for the 
weaker sections of the population to maintain a reasonable standard of living, and for 
about 60 percent of the poor the level of consumption, as well as the level of income, 
is below the poverty line. The extent of poverty highlights the need for a sustained 
policy to reduce it. The policy should encourage those capable of working to find 
1 The analysis in this Chapter relates in the main to data up to 2005, as those are the latest data available 
to the Bank of Israel from the Income and Consumption Surveys. The data shown for 2005 relate to the 
whole population, except in analyses of long-term developments. In these cases the data do not include the 
Arabs of (East) Jerusalem, as no information regarding their income and consumption is available for the 
years 2000 and 2001.
2 For an international comparison of relative poverty see the Bank of Israel’s Recent Economic 
Developments, No. 115, November 2006, 26–29.
3 According to the relative measurement used by the National Insurance Institute, a household is poor 
if its money income is less than half the net median income, adjusted for family size.
The incidence of 
poverty, as measured 
by the relative index, 
continued to rise in 
2005.
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employment, and to offer direct support (via transfer payments and transfers in kind) 
to the poor with low earning power.
Per capita welfare expenditure4 amounted to about NIS 22,000 in 2006, about 1.1 
percent higher in real terms than in 2005, when it remained constant. This expenditure 
and its composition have undergone marked changes in the last few years, particularly 
the transfer payments component (Table 8.1 and Figure 8.2). Transfer payments 
have a vital role to play in reducing poverty calculations carried out by the National 
Insurance Institute show that in the period from July 2005 to June 2006 transfer 
payments and taxes reduced the number of the poor by 27.2 percent. The relative 
contribution of transfer payments to the reduction of poverty has fallen since 2001, 
however, due to the sharp cutback in these payments (Figure 8.3).5 Thus, although the 
incidence of poverty based on personal income before tax and transfers has hardly 
changed since 2001, poverty measured by income after transfer payments and taxes 
has risen continuously. Nevertheless, the cut in transfer payments encourages entry 
4 Expenditure on education, health, social insurance and welfare, housing, community services, culture, 
entertainment, sport and religious services.
5 This calculation does not take into account the effect of the tax system and allowances on behavior in 
the labor market and hence on the incidence of poverty by income.
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into the pool of employment, so that in the long run poverty is likely to decline.6 (For 
a discussion of transfer payments and further discussion of their effects on poverty 
and inequality, see Chapter 6 in this Report and Chapter 8 in the 2005 Bank of Israel 
Annual Report.)
Poverty in Israel is particularly high among the Arabs, specifically the Bedouin 
(Box 8.2), and the ultra-orthodox Jewish population. The Arabs and the ultra-orthodox 
account for some 60 percent of all the poor. Poverty is high among large families, 
among those with low levels of education, and among families with a low number of 
wage earners. (Table 8.2).7 The problem of poverty in the groups where its incidence 
6 According to a study by K. Flug, N. Kasir (Kaliner) and I. Meidan, “The Single-Parent Families Law, 
Work Supply and Poverty,”, Economic Quarterly, Year 53, 463–516 (Hebrew), the increase in allowances 
to single mothers contributed to the rise in poverty in the short term, and to the decline of employment 
in the long term.
7 In some groups in the population some of the characteristics are correlated, thereby intensifying their 
effect on poverty.
Table 8.1
Social Expenditure, 1980-2006
(percent)
Welfare expenditurea
Transfer 
payments to 
households
Share of expenditure 
of governmentb
Share of 
GDP Share of GDP
1980 32.2 22.7 7.2
1985 34.6 22.3 8.2
1990 44.3 24.3 9.9
1995 52.0 27.1 9.8
1996 53.4 27.7 10.1
1997 54.0 27.6 10.3
1998 54.0 27.2 10.5
1999 53.9 26.8 10.6
2000 55.0 26.5 10.5
2001 56.2 28.6 11.7
2002 55.2 28.6 11.6
2003 54.3 27.8 11.2
2004 53.9 26.4 10.4
2005 54.7 25.7 10.0
2006 54.3 25.2 9.7
current NIS million
2006 157,117 60,239
a Education, health, social insurance and welfare, housing, community 
services, culture, entertainment, sport and religious services.
b Including national institutions, municipalities, and nonprofit organizations, 
most of whose expenses are financed by the government
SOURCE: Based on Central Bureau of Statistics data.
Poverty is particularly 
high among Arabs and 
the ultra-orthodox, 
and the situation has 
worsened in the last 
few years.
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is high is more acute than is indicated just by the incidence of poverty, because in most 
of those groups the depth of poverty is also greater. Differences between poverty in the 
various groups arise partly from decisions regarding participation in the labor force 
and family size. These decisions reflect families’ personal choices, which are greatly 
affected by their individual cultural environments. Child poverty rose by 2 percentage 
points in 2005 to an unprecedented 35.2 percent, which is high also by international 
Table 8.2
Indices of Relative Poverty among Individuals by Various Measures and Selected 
Groups in the Population
(percent of the population, 2005)a
Poverty indices Distribution, percentage of
Incidence 
of poverty
Income 
gapb Sen indexc the poor the population
Total 25 33 0.114
Years of education
Up to 8 53 35 0.253 25 12
9–10 36 32 0.161 14 10
11–12 25 32 0.111 31 31
13–15 19 33 0.088 18 23
16+ 12 33 0.056 12 24
Family size
1 person 22 24 0.082 5 5
2–4 persons 15 31 0.066 30 50
5–6 persons 26 35 0.128 32 30
7–8 persons 52 35 0.243 21 10
9 or more persons 66 33 0.286 12 5
Number of wage earnersd
0 78 48 0.474 36 11
1 36 26 0.129 47 33
2+ 4 23 0.013 7 47
Householder aged 65+ 26 18 0.069 9 8
Population group
Ultra-orthodoxe 63 36 0.306 16 6
Arabs 55 35 0.267 44 20
Population excl. ultra-orthodox 
and Arabs 13 29 0.057 40 74
Single-parent families 34 33 0.155 6 4
Immigrants 20 27 0.075 13 17
a Including the Arabs of East Jerusalem.
b Average gap between poverty line income and income of poor families.
c The Sen index combines the incidence of poverty, the income gap and inequality among the poor.
d In families where the head of the household is less than 65 years old.
e There is a problem of identifying the ultra-orthodox in the Income Survey. Here they are identified 
as families in which the last educational institute attended by one or more male members of the 
family was a post-secondary school talmudic college. 
SOURCE: Based on Central Bureau of Statistics Incomes Survey, 2005.
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comparison.8 The high rate of child poverty adversely affects the creation of human 
capital, which is important for future earning power.9
Over the longer term it can be seen that the extent of poverty worsened especially 
in those groups in which it was high to start with (Figure 8.4). That was due to (a) 
the wide-ranging cuts in transfer payments from 2002 which affected those groups––
which are heavily dependent on those payments––in particular, and (b) the reduction 
in those groups’ participation in the labor force. This reduction was expressed by a fall 
in the share of those employed and in the share of those employed full-time (among 
the employed in those groups). In some of the weaker groups, however, for example 
those with low levels of schooling, their involvement in the labor market increased 
slightly in 2005.
8 See the National Insurance Institute Annual Report, 2005 (Hebrew).
9 This is because of the high weight of private expenditure in total national expenditure on education, 
which reached about 25 percent in 2004. See the press release of the Central Bureau of Statistics dated 
25 July 2006, “National Expenditure On Education In 2002–2004.”
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The incidence of relative poverty in 
the total population rose steadily in the 
years from 1997 to 2005, despite the fact 
that for a significant part of that period 
there was economic growth, at times even 
rapid growth. Table 8.3 shows that growth 
reduces poverty among those with a high 
rate of participation in the labor market. 
Thus, in the general (non-ultra-orthodox) 
Jewish population, whose participation 
rate in the labor market is high, the 
incidence of poverty declined as GDP 
increased until 2000, and rose during the 
2001–03 recession (Figure 8.5). When 
the rate of growth picked up in the middle 
of 2003, at first there was a slowdown 
in the rise in poverty, and then poverty 
actually declined. In contrast, the growth 
was not reflected in the rate of poverty 
among the Arab and ultra-orthodox 
Jewish populations, which are less represented in the labor market. As a result of their 
lesser involvement in the labor market, the growth improved their conditions less 
noticeably, and for the same reason they were less affected by the recession. Also, 
as growth is education biased, it enhances only marginally the economic situation of 
groups which have a large proportion of people with low levels of education, or whose 
education does not sufficiently tally with the requirements of the labor market.
It is natural that the groups that are less involved in the labor market are more 
dependent than others on the welfare system. Thus the incidence of poverty among them 
was greatly affected by the changes in transfer payments, such as the implementation 
Table 8.3
Employment Rate and Average Wage per Employee Post by Population Group,a 2005
Employment rate 
(%) Average wage (NIS)
Men Women Men Women
Total population 60.9 52.2  8,565  5,417 
Arabs 55.6 15.9  5,347  4,101 
Ultra-orthodoxb 23.4 44.2  5,476  3,791 
Population excluding ultra-orthodox and Arabs 65.8 60.9  9,228  5,494 
a Up to age 65.
b There is a difficulty in identifying the ultra-orthodox in the Labor Force Survey and the Income Survey. 
They are identified here by the attendance of one member of the family at a post-secondary school talmudic 
college.
SOURCE: Based on Central Bureau of Statistics’ Labor Force Surveys and Incomes Surveys.
Growth helps to 
reduce poverty in the 
Jewish, non-ultra-
orthodox segment of 
the population, which 
is much involved in 
the labor market, but 
less so among Arabs 
and the ultra-orthodox, 
whose participation 
rates are low.
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of the Large Families Law (known as the Halpert Law) in 2001, followed by the steep 
cutback in the various allowances (from 2002). Since the reduction in the allowances 
did not always coincide with the changes in GDP, the connection between poverty in 
these groups and growth was a weak one.
Another factor that tends to loosen the link between poverty in the groups that are 
fairly removed from the labor market on the one hand and growth on the other derives 
from the definition of the poverty line in relative terms: during periods of growth the 
poverty line rises due to the increase in labor income around the median, while the 
income from labor of those less involved in the labor market does not necessarily 
grow in tandem with it, with the result that using the relative poverty measure, the 
poverty rate among them is likely to rise.
The rise in the incidence of relative poverty from year to year comprises two main 
effects, an “absolute” effect––that derives from a change in individuals’ income with 
a fixed real poverty line––and a “relative” effect, deriving from a real change in the 
poverty line relative to its level in the previous year. The former is the result of the 
change in each individual’s economic situation that affects his ability to buy a fixed 
basket of goods and services (reflected by the real poverty line of the previous year). 
The relative effect is the outcome of the change in the overall standard of living 
(represented by the change in the median income), assuming fixed levels of individual 
income.10
An analysis of the contribution of each of these two effects to the rise in poverty 
shows that in 2005, as in most years, the relative effect acted to raise the incidence of 
poverty, while the absolute effect worked in the opposite direction. In 2005 too the 
relative effect was the stronger, so that relative poverty rose (Figure 8.6). The analysis 
of the two effects shows that although the purchasing power of the poor increased in 
2005, it did so by less than the increase for the general population.
Based on the essential-needs approach, poverty declined in 2005 by about 3 
percentage points to 23.4 percent (Box 8.1 below).11 The reduction encompassed 
broad sections of the population. The improved poverty situation reflected mainly a 
rise in income deriving from economic growth, and a small fall in the poverty line.12 
Viewed over the longer term, poverty fell from 23.8 percent in 1997 to 20.9 percent in 
2001, due to growth and the rise in transfer payments, and rose thereafter until 2004 
10  The change in the incidence of poverty comprises three elements: an absolute component, a relative 
component, and a combined component. The third component is negligible, and here it is incorporated 
into the relative component.
11  Not including the Arabs of East Jerusalem. If they are included, the poverty rate of individuals 
declined from 27.9 percent in 2004 to 24.2 in 2005. Gottlieb and Manor (2005) take, in addition to 
the poverty line, an estimate of private essential medical expenses not included in the health basket. 
According to that calculation the incidence of poverty among individuals declined from 30.3 percent to 
26.9 percent (including the Arabs of East Jerusalem).
12  The decline in the poverty line reflects a drop in expenditure on the education, transport and personal 
goods components, which was partly offset by increased expenditure on food, housing, and clothing and 
footwear.
The purchasing power 
of the poor increased 
in 2005, but by less 
than the increase for 
the general population.
Based on the 
essential-needs 
approach, poverty 
declined significantly in 
2005.
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to a record level of 26.7 percent, at first mainly due to the recession and later due to 
the cuts in allowances.
The rest of this Chapter deals with several aspects of welfare policy. Section 2 
distinguishes between households suffering from intense poverty, whose consumption 
as well as their income is below the poverty line, and households who manage to 
consume more than the poverty line although they are poor. Section 3 discusses 
proposals for reducing poverty, and Section 4 deals with the health basket.
Box 8.1
Calculating the poverty index based on the basic-needs aproach
The professional literature on poverty indices distinguishes between a relative 
measure, according to which someone is considered poor if his standard of 
living is significantly lower than that of the population in general, and an 
absolute measure, which defines the poor as those who are unable to buy a 
fixed basket of goods and services reflecting basic needs. In the last few years 
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another type of index has been developed in the US and Canada, that combines 
the two approaches (see Chapter 8 in the Bank of Israel 2005 Annual Report).1 
These indices focus on the ability to obtain basic needs, similar to the absolute 
approach, but with the level of the consumption components determined on a 
relative basis, according to the composition of each component in the overall 
population.
The poverty line that reflects essential consumption calculated in this chapter 
consists of food products, clothing and footwear, housing, expenditure on 
energy and water, and certain private expenditure on education. To these are 
added, by means of a (small) multiplier, certain items of personal expenditure 
such as transport and minimal leisure expenditure.
As far as the expenditure level for each of the essential items is concerned, 
the food basket is determined objectively, in a manner similar to that used in 
Canada (the market basket measure, or MBM)2 based on the minimum nutrition 
values needed to maintain health, taking into consideration the age and sex 
composition of the family.3The other elements in the basket of essentials are 
quantified according to the average of the relevant expenditures of the 30th 
to 35th percentiles, similar to the method developed by the the National 
Academy of Science, NAS.4 The share of standard total per capita expenditure 
on essentials that is spent on food at the poverty line is about 30 percent, and on 
housing, about 50 percent (see table).
In determining whether a particular household is poor, its money income is 
taken into account together with income in kind (in contrast with the official 
relative approach, in which only money income is considered), and then the 
following are deducted: compulsory payments, expenses related to going to 
1 See D. Gottlieb and R. Manor (2005), “On the Choice of a Policy-Oriented Poverty Measure,” 
Discussion Paper Series, Monaster Center for Economic Research, Ben Gurion University of 
the Negev. For alternative calculations of poverty according to essential requirements see Y. 
Alfandari and T. Kaplan (2003). "Proposal for an Absolute Measurement of the Poor in Israel", 
August, 1 to 57; M. Sabag-Endweld and L. Achdut (2004) "Developing An Experimental Poverty 
Index In Israel Based On Household Expenditure," Special Research and Surveys, the National 
Insurance Institute, No. 82.
2 Human Resources Development Canada (2003). “Understanding the 2000 Low Income 
Statistics Based on the Market Basket Measure,” May, Applied Research Branch, Strategic 
Policy, SP-569-03-03E, Canada.
3 See D. Nitzan-Kaluski (2004) “Proposed method for calculating the costs of foods vital for 
infants, children and adults, by age and sex.” Ministry of Health, Jerusalem, 1–9 (Hebrew).
4 C.F. Citro and R.T. Michael, eds. (1995). “Measuring Poverty: A New Approach,” National 
Research Council, N.A.P. Washington DC. A direct calculation of expenditure on basic needs 
in the US is consistent with the expenditure of families in the 30th to 35th percentiles; see B.R. 
Bergmann and T. Renwick 1993, “A Budget-Based Definition of Poverty With an Application 
to Single-Parent Families,” The Journal of Human Resources, 28, No. 1, Winter, University of 
Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA, 1-24.
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work (child-care where both parents work or in case of a single mother, and 
travel costs), self-financed health expenditure, and alimony.
Components of the Poverty Line by the Basic Needs Approach, 2005 
Items of basic needs in the poverty line NIS %
Food  771 30.4
Housing  1,241 49.0
Clothes and footwear  116 4.6
Education, transport and personal effects  405 16.0
Poverty line  2,533 100.0
SOURCE: Based on Central Bureau of Statistics, Expenditure Survey 2005.
Box 8.2
Poverty among the Bedouin
The Bedouin population in 2004 totaled about 180,000, according to data 
from the Galilee Association.1 About 70 percent of them live in recognized 
settlements, and the other 53,000 in settlements not recognized by the State of 
Israel due to disputes over land ownership.2 Most of the Israeli Bedouin live in 
the southern part of Israel.3
1 Based on research in progress by S. Abu-Badar and D. Gottlieb, “Poverty among the Bedouin 
and in the general Arab society in Israel”, the Van Leer Institute, Jerusalem (Hebrew). The source 
of the data in this box is the Galilee Association.
2 The State claims that it owns the disputed land. Furthermore, in 1984 the High Court of 
Appeal, basing itself on the 1858 Ottoman Land Order, ruled that the disputed land belonged to 
the State. The Bedouin claim ownership of a large part of the land, and argue that many Bedouin 
did not take to trouble to obtain the deeds proving their ownership in the time of the Ottoman rule 
and the British mandate, as they (the Bedouin) had their own system of ownership. In 1969 the 
government started establishing villages intended to serve the Bedouin as permanent settlements. 
The dispute was not settled, as there was no agreement over the amount of compensation to be 
paid to the Bedouin. For a more detailed discussion see Swirski and Hasson, 2005, “Invisible 
Citizens in Israel, Government Policy toward Negev Bedouin,” the Adva Center, Tel Aviv.
3 According to the 2004 Statistical Abstract, the Bedouin settlements in the Negev, the 
desert region of southern Israel, accounted for about 160,000 Bedouin in 2002. This number is 
higher than that obtained from the 2004 Galilee Association survey (130,000). The latter is less 
reasonable, taking into account the high natural population growth rate of the Bedouin.
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The statistical data gathered by the Central Bureau of Statistics hardly relates 
to the Bedouin in non-recognized settlements. In particular they do not feature 
in the data on poverty. Hence the data herein is based on an extensive data-
collection project carried out by the Galilee Association among Arabs, with a 
focus on the Bedouin who live scattered over a wide area.
There is a very high incidence of poverty among the Bedouin; in 2004 it was 
66.4 percent, and among those living in non-recognized settlements it was even 
higher, 79.2 percent. The latter account for some 65 percent of all the Bedouin 
poor. In the non-recognized settlements the depth of poverty, as measured by the 
income gap of poor families and by the Sen index, was high (see Table 1). The 
official definition of poverty relates only to money income. Non-financial income 
from domestic (i.e., home) production constitutes a significant supply source for 
the needs of the Bedouin, especially so in the non-recognized settlements. It 
is reasonable to assume, therefore, that poverty as measured using the official 
definition is slightly higher than the true measure.4
Among the main reasons for poverty in this population are the low rates of 
participation in the labor force and employment among Bedouin women, and 
the high rates of unemployment and discouragement from searching for jobs. 
According to labor market data on the Bedouin in the South, only about 7 percent 
of Bedouin women aged 15 and over are employed, and among the men 22 
percent of the labor force are unemployed (Table 2). It was also found that the 
proportion of men outside the labor force who despaired of finding work was 11 
4 According to the 2003 Social Survey of the Central Bureau of Statistics, which enables 
calculation of poverty to be made using the subjective approach, about a third of the Bedouin aged 
twenty and over living in the South (in recognized settlements) felt poor, and as stated, the rates 
obtained using the official calculation are far higher.
Table 1
Poverty in the Israeli Bedouin Population (Individuals), 2004
Incidence 
of poverty
Income 
gapa Sen indexb
(percent)
Bedouin 66.4 35.3 0.315
Bedouin in recognized settlements 61.0 32.1 0.267
Bedouin in non-recognized settlements 79.2 41.1 0.425
a The average gap between poverty line income and income of poor families.
b The Sen index combines the extent of poverty, the income gap and inequality 
among the poor.
SOURCE: Abu Badar and Gottlieb, 2007 (research in progress); data for 
calculations, the Galilee Society.
In 2004 there was a 
very high incidence 
of poverty among the 
Bedouin, 66.4 percent; 
among those living 
in non-recognized 
settlements it was 
almost 80 percent.
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percent (the discouraged worker effect). Women’s low rate of participation in 
the labor force is related to the cultural convention in Bedouin society that, to 
a greater degree than in other groups in the population, married women do not 
work outside of their home, and if they do, not outside their settlements.
The absence of certain basic infrastructures in their settlements, for instance, 
education and transport, is one of the reasons for the very low standard of 
living among the Bedouin, and it also renders their labor market participation 
difficult. The situation is to a great extent the outcome of the land-ownership 
dispute between the Bedouin in the non-recognized settlements and the State 
(see footnote 2 below). As a result, there is no public investment in those 
settlements, either in road construction or in other essential infrastructures. This 
state of affairs also deters private investment in those settlements.
Another element among the causes of poverty is the large number of children 
per family, which lowers the current standard of living. In addition, the low rates 
of schooling and problems with the level of education have a direct bearing on 
future poverty, which is affected by the ability of the young to accumulate human 
capital appropriate to their future absorption in the labor market. Thus, 10.7 
percent of the youth aged 15 to 17 from the Bedouin settlements in the South 
are outside the education system. A large proportion, 15 percent, of the Bedouin 
in the South are illiterate. Among women the figure is even more striking––21.7 
percent. Nevertheless, the age composition of the illiterates indicates a marked 
improvement in basic education over the years: thus, for example, the rate of 
illiteracy among those aged 60 years or more is 32.8 percent, while among the 
15–24-year age group the rate is one percent.
The persistent state of poverty among the Bedouin causes them, and 
particularly their children, long-term damage. It is very important to reduce 
the high and persistent rates of poverty among them. A central element 
Table 2
Participation Rate, Employment and Unemployment among Bedouin in Southern 
Israel, 2004
(percent)
Total Men Women
Rate of participation  in labor force 32.2 55.5 8.8
Employed full-time 70.7 72.0 62.6
Employed part-time 8.1 5.9 22.0
Unemployed (unemployment rate) 21.2 22.1 15.4
Employment rate 25.4 43.3 7.4
SOURCE: Socioeconomic Survey of the Galilee Association.
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2. POVERTY AND CONSUMPTION
In the light of the high rates of poverty in Israel and the resultant need to formulate 
a policy to reduce them, it is important to distinguish between households whose 
poverty is particularly acute and the rest of the poor. Families whose consumption, 
and not only their income, is below the poverty line suffer from more severe poverty 
than those whose consumption, despite their being poor, is above the poverty line. 
Consumption in excess of income at low income levels is often incurred among 
families that possess property and have suffered temporary income loss, thereby being 
temporarily poor; by using their savings and property or taking loans they maintain 
a relatively reasonable level of consumption in the short term, to smooth income 
fluctuations. Indeed, average consumption is higher than average income among the 
lower income deciles.13 Another reason for this may be a possible downward-bias in 
income reporting compared to the reporting of expenditures.
Poor households whose consumption is below the poverty line may be viewed 
as persistently poor (see Box 8.3). Persistent poverty is generally measured by 
longitudinal surveys of a fixed group of families whose economic situation has been 
monitored for years. Such surveys are typically performed in developed countries, but 
do not yet exist in Israel. In practice, the extensive surveys published together with 
the population census about once every eleven years may in some sense be considered 
as a survey with longitudinal information, albeit of very low frequency. A study of 
persistent poverty carried out on the basis of the census results of 1983 and 1995 
for those families that appeared in both surveys (Shayo and Vaknin, 2000)14 shows 
13  Average expenditure on consumption adjusted for household size in 2005 was about 160 percent 
higher than average disposable income in the lowest decile, about 80 percent higher in the second-from-
lowest decile, and about 40 percent higher in the third.
14  M. Shayo and M. Vaknin, 2000, “Poverty Persistence in Israel: Results from the Linked 1983 and 
1995 Census Data,” Economic Quarterly, Year 47, December, 597–628 (Hebrew).
in alleviating their hardship should be a decisive increase in investment, 
especially in the infrastructure. Lack of a proper transport infrastructure makes 
it difficult for them to go to work, and to receive health and education services, 
thereby deepening their poverty. The connection between the land dispute and 
the shortfall in investment highlights the great importance of finding a quick 
solution to the dispute acceptable to both sides. To reduce the incidence of long 
term poverty by increasing employment, the level of education must be raised 
and the high drop-out rate from the education system at all age levels must 
be cut. In the light of the cultural obstacles that prevent many women from 
going out to work, frameworks should be devised that are appropriate to the 
employment needs of that population.
The poverty of families 
whose consumption as 
well as their income is 
below the poverty line 
is more severe than 
that of families who 
despite their being 
poor use savings 
and loans to achieve 
consumption above the 
poverty line.
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that 35 percent of those who were poor in 1983 were still poor in 1995, and that the 
probability of being poor in both years was higher among Arabs and the low-educated 
than for the rest.
As there are no ongoing longitudinal surveys in Israel, alternative indicators 
of persistent poverty must be used. The fact that a family is unable to smooth its 
consumption in response to fluctuations in its income is evidence of acute poverty, 
and the lack of ability to avail itself of the loan market or of assets and savings from 
the past in order to maintain consumption above the poverty line points to permanent 
poverty.15
15  See also E. Menirav, 2002, “The Measurement of Poverty: A Methodological Note,” Economic 
Quarterly, Year 49, June, 321–354 (Hebrew).
Box 8.3
Income and consumption as indicators of family poverty
In most cases poverty is measured in money terms. It is usually measured by 
current income, which is taken as representing the ability to realize a given 
standard of living. Such a measure reflects poverty at a point in time. The 
question arises as to whether it genuinely reflects the standard of living, and in 
particular, the permanent standard of living. In this context a second question 
arises: does income properly express the economic situation of the household, 
or ought consumption also be examined? Families’ current expenditure on 
consumption is taken as an approximation of consumption at the level of the 
individual.
Several claims are made in support of consumption rather than income in 
measuring the sources available to a household; the main ones are described 
below.
The main claim made in favoring consumption over income in defining the 
sources available to a household is that the former constitutes a better estimate of 
the ongoing standard of living. This approach derives from Milton Friedman’s 
permanent income hypothesis (1957), according to which current income 
and expenditure consist of a permanent and a temporary component. Most 
current consumption is determined by permanent income, with the temporary 
component of income accounting for a relatively small part of consumption. In 
other words, consumption is more stable than income. Thus, a temporary fall 
in income will be expressed by a smaller decline in consumption, by falling 
back on savings or taking loans. Also families whose current income is lower 
than their average income over their lifetime (the young and the elderly) will 
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consume according to their long-term income.1 We would therefore expect that families whose 
income temporarily falls below the poverty line, and the young and the elderly whose current 
income is below the poverty line will consume at a level above their current income, provided 
they have the ability to borrow or to realize assets. Thus the standard of living of such families 
is not necessarily low, although their current income indicates poverty. On the other hand, poor 
families unable to draw on savings or to obtain loans must adjust their consumption on an 
ongoing basis to their current income, and thus have a low standard of living.
Another claim supporting the preference of consumption over income as an indicator of 
standard of living is that the reported income is less reliable than reported expenditure, 
particularly among the self-employed.2 This is so because some households with undeclared 
sources of income avoid submitting true details of their income out of fear that the information 
will reach the tax authorities (in the case of tax evaders) or to the welfare institutions (in the case 
of receipt of support payments by fraudulent claims). As a result, indices of poverty are likely to 
suffer from some bias when the economic situation of a household is assessed via its income.
Against these arguments, the following considerations support the use of income rather than 
consumption data:
A family whose expenditure is below the poverty line is not necessarily poor: it may be 
saving part of its income. If its income is above the poverty line it is not defined as poor, even if 
its consumption expenditure is low.
Poverty measures based on income reflect current poverty, which includes families that are 
poor temporarily, as well as those permanently poor. Clearly, permanent poverty is a more 
serious problem than temporary poverty, but the temporary poverty, too, is a problem that must 
not be ignored.
Expenditure data also suffers from certain problems, among other reasons because of the short 
time period for which the families sampled are asked to report––only two weeks, compared with 
three months in the case of income. In addition, the available data relate to nominal expenditure, 
and not to the more relevant real consumption.
Official poverty indices world wide view family poverty via income and not expenditure, 
which probably indicates a certain revealed preference for the income variable. Nevertheless, as 
is shown above, viewing family poverty from the aspect of consumption expenditure can also 
be justified.3 Many researchers have focused on expenditure to examine poverty, and they found 
significant differences between the results obtained using the two definitions of poverty.4
1 F. Modigliani and R.H. Brumberg, 1954, “Utility analysis and the consumption function: an interpretation of 
cross-section data,” in K.K. Kurihara, ed., Post-Keynesian Economics, New Brunswick, NJ. Rutgers University 
Press, 388–436.
2 See for instance A. Deaton, 1992, Understanding Consumption, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
3 D.S. Johnson, 2004, “Measuring Consumption and Consumption Poverty: Possibilities and Issues,” American 
Enterprise Institute, November, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1–31.
4 Abul Naga Ramses, 1994, "Identifying the Poor: A Multiple Indicator Approach, London School of Economics, 
DARP/9, 1-25. . Meyer Bruce D. and James Sullivan, 2006, “Three Decades of Consumption and Income Poverty”, 
Working Paper, #06-35, September, 1-43.
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The current standard of living in 2005 (as expressed in consumption expenditure) 
of 40 percent of the poor was relatively high (i.e., above the poverty line), despite their 
low level of income. Both methods give the result that the poor whose consumption 
was below the poverty line (the “very poor”) constituted 14 percent of Israel’s total 
population.
According to both the relative and the basic needs approaches, the poor whose 
consumption was above the poverty line (the “less poor”) constituted around 10 
percent of the population (Figure 8.7). This consistency suggests at frictional poverty 
caused by families’ exposure to temporary shocks to their income. The relatively short 
time that these shocks continue makes it easier for families to smooth consumption 
over time.
The proportion of the very poor, however, changed: according to the relative 
approach it rose, by 5.4 percentage points, in the period from 1997 to 2005; according 
to the basic needs approach the proportion of the very poor in 2005 was only one 
percentage point higher than in 1997, reflecting a reduction up to 2001, followed by a 
rapid rise till 2004, and a marked decline in 2005. In a long-term perspective, the close 
link between the change in the incidence of poverty overall and that in the proportion 
of the very poor is striking.
The depth of poverty among the very poor was higher than among the rest of the 
poor––an income gap of about 36 percent compared with 28 percent according to the 
relative poverty approach, and 33 percent compared with 27 percent according to the 
basic needs approach. The families for whom the gap between their income and the 
poverty line is particularly high are also the families that have difficulty in achieving 
a level of consumption above the poverty line.
In 2005 the current 
standard of living of 
40 percent of the poor 
was above the poverty 
line, despite their low 
level of income.
The severity of poverty 
among the very poor 
(whose consumption 
is below the poverty 
line) was more acute 
than among the rest of 
the poor––an income 
differential of about 36 
percent compared with 
28 percent according 
to the relative poverty 
approach.
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A comparison of consumption relative to income among the very poor shows that 
some of them manage to consume more than their income, but obviously not more 
than the poverty line. More than half of the very poor families, however, do not do not 
manage to obtain additional loans or use assets to finance their consumption, and even 
consume less than their income, apparently because of compulsory repayments, such 
as mortgage repayments. 
The social characteristics of the very poor are similar to those of the less poor 
with regard to the number of years of schooling, the number of breadwinners in the 
family, and with regard to population sector (e.g., Arabs and the ultra-orthodox ). 
Hence, those populations with a high incidence of very poor also have a considerable 
incidence of less poor (Table 8.4).
Nevertheless, in those sections of the population with low labor-market 
participation––those with little schooling, those without, or with few, wage earners, 
the ultra-orthodox––the very poor constitute an especially high proportion. Among 
new immigrants too the acutely poor are more highly represented, indicating the 
difficulty they have in smoothing their consumption due to lack of assets and hence 
also their difficulty in obtaining loans.
The results described above are common to both the relative and the basic needs 
approaches. Differences between them arise, however, with regard to two groups––
those aged 65+, and new immigrants. The basic needs measure gives a much lower 
incidence of quite poor among those aged 65 and over, and the share of the very 
poor is much higher among new immigrants, than the figures obtained by the relative 
poverty approach. This is because of the high rate of apartment ownership among 
those aged 65+ and a low rate of ownership among the new immigrants, a factor taken 
into account in the basic needs approach but not in the relative approach.
The findings in Table 8.4 regarding the incidence of the very poor by characteristics 
do not provide sufficient information about a relation between the characteristics and 
acute poverty. This is because of the high correlation between the characteristics 
themselves. For example, among the ultra-orthodox there is a high incidence of large 
families with few wage earners, which offers at least a partial explanation for the high 
share of very poor among them.
In order to examine the marginal contribution of each of the characteristics to 
the probability that someone who is poor will be very poor, we used a regression to 
estimate the probability of being very poor.16 The regression coefficients give the 
specific effect of each characteristic on the  probability that a poor individual will be 
very poor (Table 8.5).
The analysis shows that the variables that increase the probability that a family will 
be poor, i.e., low level of schooling, large family, part of the Arab or ultra-orthodox 
sector, single parent, also increase the probability that it will be very poor.
16  A regression of this type was estimated in K. Flug and N. (Kaliner) Kasir, 2003, “Poverty and 
Employment, and the Gulf between them,” Israel Economic Review, Vol. 1 No 1, 55–80.
The very poor are 
similar to the quite 
poor with regard 
to the number of 
years of schooling 
and the number of 
breadwinners in the 
family. Nevertheless, 
in the weak sections 
of the labor market–
–those with little 
schooling, those 
without, or with few, 
wage earners, and the 
ultra-orthodox––the 
very poor constitute 
an especially high 
proportion.
A rise in the level of 
education is the major 
factor that lowers the 
probability of a family 
being very poor: the 
probability of being 
very poor for a family 
whose head completed 
8 years of schooling is 
four times higher than 
that for a family whose 
head has 16 or more 
years of education.
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The higher the level of education, the lower the probability of being very poor. 
Thus, the probability of acute poverty for a family in which the head of the household 
has 8 years of schooling is more than twice as high as that for a family whose head 
completed 11–12 years of schooling; and for a family whose head has 16 years of 
education the probability is is a quarter of that of the first family above, whose head has 
8 years of schooling. The probability of being very poor among those with low levels 
of schooling is relatively high both because of their difficulties in finding employment 
and because of the low wages paid to those who work.
The number of children in the family has a strong influence on the probability of 
poor families being very poor, because the larger the family, the greater the expenditure 
needed to maintain a reasonable standard of living.
Table 8.5
Probability of the Poor being Very Poor, by the Relative Poverty Measure,a 2005
Selected results from log regression (explanatory variable: very poor=1, slightly poor=0)
Coefficient
Chances of the poor being 
very poor against being 
slightly poorb
Age group (compared to ages 31-45)
Up to 24 0.870 2.4
25-30 0.188* 1.2
46-64 -0.274 0.8
65+ 0.201* 1.2
Years of education (compared to 11-12 years)
Up to 8 0.802 2.2
9-10 0.306 1.4
13-15 -0.534 0.6
16+ -1.392 0.2
13-15 (religious education)c 1.019 2.8
16+ (religious education)c 1.281 3.6
Number of individuals in the family (compared to 2-4 individuals)
1 0.672 2.0
5-6 0.603 1.8
7+ 1.178 3.2
Selected population groups
Ultra-orthodoxd 1.758 5.8
Arabs 1.008 2.7
Single-parent families 1.058 2.9
Immigrants (since 1990) 0.862 2.4
a Including Arabs of East Jerusalem.
b Relative to the ommitted group.
c Where the last place of education was a post-secondary school talmudic college.
d There is a difficulty in identifying ultra-orthodox in the Income Surveys. They have been identified 
here as those families where the last place of education for at least one member of the household was 
a post-secondary school talmudic college.
* Not significant.
SOURCE: Central Bureau of Statistics, Expenditure Survey 2005.
The probability of a 
poor family being very 
poor rises with family 
size.
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Furthermore, among Arab families and the ultra-orthodox the probability of being 
very poor is higher than among the rest of the population, over and above the effects 
of family size, education and age. This is due mainly to cultural obstacles that reduce 
their participation in the labor force and to problems regarding the quality and content 
of their education, which are contributory factors to their low wage levels. Among 
Arabs this is also related to the peripheral location of their settlements, and apparently 
also to discrimination in employment.17 As a result of all the above, the probability of 
being very poor among the Arabs is three times higher and among the ultra-orthodox, 
six times higher than for the rest. Taking into consideration the quality of ultra-
orthodox education, the probability of being very poor is even higher.
The probability of being very poor in the working-age group (i.e., up to 64 years) 
declines as the age of the head of household rises. Possible reasons include the rise in 
wages because of experience and seniority in work, and the accumulation of property 
through savings. At age 65 and over the probability of being very poor rises again. 
Two other groups with a high probability of being very poor are new immigrants and 
single-parent families––in the first the probability is twice as high, and in the second, 
three times as high.
3. PROPOSALS TO REDUCE POVERTY AND INCREASE EMPLOYMENT
The high incidence of poverty in Israel highlights the need to adopt a continued policy 
to reduce poverty, while preserving fiscal discipline, which supports sustainable 
growth. Sustainable growth is itself necessary, but not sufficient, for reducing poverty, 
as it trickles down slowly and only partially to the weaker sections of the population. 
Government intervention is needed to ensure that the benefits of growth also reach 
those sectors.
The policy should include active measures intended to integrate those capable of 
working into the labor force, and to increase the wages of the low-paid. In Israel less 
use is made of active labor market policies than in other developed countries, despite 
the greater need for such measures than in other countries because of relatively low 
levels of employment. Intensifying an active policy will reduce poverty in the groups 
that are under-represented in the labor force, e.g., Arabs and the ultra-orthodox (who 
account for some 60 percent of the total number of poor), and will enable them to 
enjoy more of the benefits of growth. For some groups among the poor, individual 
programs––taking into account their specific cultural values––need to be devised to 
absorb them into employment
For those incapable of working, or with low earning ability, transfer payments are 
part of the solution to poverty; at the same time, tests of employability and means tests 
17  See R. Klinov, 1999, “Changes in the Wage Structure––Wage Gaps Between and Within Industries: 
Israel 1970–1997,” The Institute for Socioeconomic Research, the General Federation of Labour, 
Discussion Paper No. 4, August.
Among Arab families 
and the ultra-orthodox 
the probability of being 
very poor is higher 
than among the rest 
of the population, over 
and above the effects 
of the size of family.
The high rates of 
poverty in Israel 
highlight the need 
to adopt an ongoing 
policy to reduce 
poverty, especially 
as growth trickles 
down slowly and 
only partially to the 
weaker sections of the 
population.
The policy should focus 
on active measures 
to integrate those 
capable of working into 
the labor force, and to 
increase the income of 
the low-paid. For some 
sectors of the poor 
population, particularly 
the Bedouin and the 
ultra-orthodox, special 
programs need to be 
devised, that take 
their specific cultural 
characteristics and 
values into account.
For those incapable 
of working, or with low 
earning ability, transfer 
payments are part of 
the solution to poverty.
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should be improved to ensure that welfare funds are directed more efficiently to the 
genuinely needy.
Most of the proposals set forth herein involve budgetary costs, particularly in their 
first few years. In the long term they enable cost savings to be made, due to the reduction 
in National Insurance outlays as a result of the reduction in poverty and of the increase 
in tax revenues following the rise in employment. The costs of these proposals could 
be met in three ways: (1) by increasing the efficiency of the budget allocation between 
the various government ministries; (2) by raising the budget allocated to the treatment 
of poverty at the expense of other items (changing the order of priorities), and (3) by 
increasing the overall budget framework. Some of the proposals herein hardly involve 
budget costs, for example the proposals regarding foreign workers and the Minimum 
Wage Law. The total budget cost of the program to reduce poverty depends mainly 
on government decisions about their goals and the rate of progress chosen to achieve 
them.
At the beginning of 2007 the government decided on the gradual implementation 
of “steps to narrow the social gaps and to increase the rate of participation in the 
labor force.” The total net cost of these steps to the year 2010 was estimated at 
NIS 1.2 billion. The steps included the introduction of earned income credits (EITCs), 
a pension for every worker, stricter enforcement of labor laws, and the subsidization of 
day care centers and nurseries. It was also decided that the EITCs will be implemented 
gradually, by 2008, and universal pension coverage no later than 2010.
Alongside the measures to reduce poverty, it is important to set social targets––a 
poverty target, an employment goal, and goals in education. Setting targets will help to 
commit the government to the ongoing struggle against poverty, will influence budget 
priorities, and will provide a scale against which to measure government activity in 
these spheres––and will thus help to raise the level of social welfare and to reduce 
poverty.
a. Families whose head of household is of working age and employable
EITCs for those earning low wages. The purpose of introducing EITCs is to reduce 
poverty among working families by increasing the return to labor, while encouraging 
households to take responsibility for their economic situation. It is therefore important 
that the EITC increase with the number of hours worked and that it be granted up to 
a certain level of family income. It is also important that larger families, which are 
generally the poorer ones, receive larger EITCs. EITCs with these characteristics will 
encourage greater involvement in the labor market among large families, including 
Arab and ultra-orthodox Jewish families. It is proposed that payment be made directly 
by the government to the worker.
In February 2007 the government decided to introduce EITCs on a trial basis in 2008 
and 2009 in locations where the program to encourage employment is implemented. 
From 2010 the system of EITCs will be extended to additional areas.
The government 
decided on the gradual 
implementation of 
“steps to narrow the 
social gaps and to 
increase the rate 
of participation in 
the labor force.” 
The steps included 
the introduction of 
earned income credits 
(EITCs), a pension 
for every worker, 
stricter enforcement 
of labor laws, and 
the subsidization of 
day care centers and 
nurseries.
Alongside the 
measures to reduce 
poverty, it is important 
to set long-term social 
targets.
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The Minimum Wage Law. In order to increase the return to labor for the low-paid, 
and in the light of the relatively low level of compliance with the Minimum Wage Law, 
it is important to enforce that law more strictly. The implementation of the February 
2007 government decision to increase resources allocated to the enforcement of the 
labor laws will help to achieve this objective. Enforcement should be tightened by 
increasing resources via automatically channeling income from fines into the relevant 
enforcement budget.
It has been agreed that the level of the minimum wage be increased gradually over 
several years (see Chapter 8 on Issues in Welfare Policy). It was decided that after the 
rise in the minimum wage in 2007, a joint committee made up of representatives of 
the government, the employers and the General Federation of Labour (New Histadrut) 
would decide on the next stages of the increase. It is important that the committee 
examine the implications of the rises that have already taken place, and that the 
future rises be taken into account in calculating labor productivity and considering 
unemployment. At this stage certain additional changes should be made to the 
Minimum Wage Law: all wage components that are not reimbursement of expenses 
or incentives for extra work should be included in the minimum wage calculation. 
The (automatic) updating of the minimum wage should be based on the median 
wage and not as at present the average wage, so that the minimum wage will not be 
affected by sharp changes in specific occupations or industries, and will guarantee 
the maintenance of a reasonable basic standard of living, which was the Knesset’s 
original intention.
The EITC and the minimum wage both act to raise the return to labor of employees 
with low levels of schooling. The system of EITCs will have an important role to 
play even after the expected increases in the minimum wage, because of the poor 
enforcement of the latter and the fact that the proposed EITCs focus on low-
income families. Nonetheless, weak enforcement together with EITCs transfers the 
responsibility for maintaining a reasonable wage from employers to the taxpayers.
Non-Israeli workers. The high proportion of non-Israeli workers (232,900, some 
8 percent of the civilian labor force in 2006) and the low cost of employing them 
pushed Israelis with low levels of education out of the labor force (including Arabs 
who had worked in construction or agriculture), and increased the incidence of poverty 
among them. It is therefore important to reduce the number of non-Israeli workers 
significantly, setting a long-term target. This has become even more important because 
of the increase in the minimum wage, which boosts the incentive for employers to give 
jobs to foreign workers, regarding whom the enforcement of labor laws, including the 
minimum wage, is even slacker.
The number of work permits should be cut, and the enforcement of the limitation 
on the number of foreign workers should be intensified, while strictly complying with 
human rights requirements. Households employing foreign workers should be brought 
into the realm of enforcement.
The system of issuing work permits should be changed, so that the permits are made 
out directly to the worker and not to others such as the employers or corporations, as 
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the system of binding workers to particular employers gives the permit holder power 
that may be misused to pay less than the competitive wage and to give employment 
under unreasonable conditions. In the construction industry foreign workers are 
employed via a corporation. In agriculture and care services changes are due to be 
made in 2007 that will reduce the extent of binding workers to employers.
It is important to make the employment of foreign workers more costly, by (1) 
stricter enforcement of labor laws, including the Minimum Wage Law, and (2) raising 
the tax rate on the employment of non-Israeli workers, according to need––i.e., raising 
the rate as long as the rate of non-Israeli employees is higher than the target.18 It is 
proposed that employers of foreign care-workers should continue to be exempt from 
this tax, in the light of the vital dependence of many of the elderly on this service. At 
the same time, the entry of Israelis into this work––the demand for which is expanding 
rapidly and which is appropriate for those with low levels of education––should be 
encouraged. It is proposed that extra hours of care be granted to those entitled care 
who employ Israeli caregivers.
Employment centers (the “Mehalev” or “Wisconsin” program) and the 
Employment Service. Their importance lies in their helping to remove obstacles that 
prevent those outside the labor force and the unemployed from going out to work. It 
is therefore important to continue operating these centers, and to extend them into 
other geographical locations, taking note of lessons learned from experience so far. 
Specifically, the system of incentives should be changed so that the centers would be 
rewarded mainly on the basis of the number and quality of successful job placements 
they achieve, and less on the reduction in the number of allowances paid out. In 
addition, the operators should be encouraged, via incentives, to carry out occupational 
training. These recommendations are consistent with the program drawn up recently 
by the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor.
The Employment Service should be strengthened too, to improve the job placement 
of work seekers who do not receive income support payments.
Subsidizing the costs of going out to work. In February 2007 the government 
decided to allocate NIS 200 million over three years to subsidize day care centers and 
nurseries by means of tokens that would be distributed to families on the basis of the 
level of income. It is also recommended that public transport be made more accessible 
and to subsidize the cost of using it to get to work from high-unemployment locations 
in outlying districts. The subsidy should not be in the form of tax credit points, to 
ensure that those earning less than the lowest tax bracket also benefit.
Professional training and complementing education for adults. These are 
important aspects of improving the earning ability of those with low levels of education. 
In the last few years professional training financed by the government has been slashed, 
but because of its importance it should be reinstated and expanded. Training should 
be motivated by employers’ demand for workers and should be appropriate to the 
18  The tax was raised from 8 percent to 10 percent as part of the Arrangements Law to the 2007 budget. 
This adjustment was relatively minor compared to the original proposal to raise the rate to 18 percent.
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participants. Therefore employers should also be involved in determining the content 
of the training, its planning and implementation. Special training programs should be 
designed for special groups, such as ultra-orthodox women and Arab women, taking 
their cultural and other needs into account.
The roles of training and job-finding should be brought together under one roof, as 
in the Mehalev centers. Those giving the retraining programs should be encouraged by 
means of incentives based on their degree of success in finding jobs for the participants 
and in the quality of the job-placements. The program should be monitored closely, so 
that improvements can be introduced as necessary.
The system for complementing education to the level of 12 years of schooling for 
adults who have reasonable chances of finding jobs in the labor market should be 
extended. This would enable those with low education to join professional training 
programs, thereby easing their absorption and progress in the work place. Moreover, 
it would have a good influence on their children’s schooling.
The Unemployment Insurance Law. In the last few years the criteria of the 
Unemployment Insurance Law have become stricter, and they are severe also by 
international standards. Hence, in the light of the importance of unemployment 
insurance in improving employment in the long term, the entitlement criteria should 
be eased. In particular, the period for accumulating the entitlement to receive 
unemployment pay should be shortened, and the period of the entitlement itself should 
be extended. The period spent in professional training should not be counted as part of 
the period of entitlement to receive unemployment pay. The recent decision to tighten 
the conditions of entitlement to unemployment pay for the young clearly runs counter 
to the recommendations described here.
The Encouragement of Capital Investments Law. The law should be amended 
to make it more effective in encouraging employment in outlying areas and will bring 
the battle against poverty into its orbit. A significant step in this direction is the change 
in the map of preferential areas to take into account also towns’ socioeconomic profile. 
It is also recommended that benefits be granted for human capital, with a special focus 
on enhancing the human capital of those with low levels of education.
Regional employment centers. These should be developed as a means of reducing 
the dependence of residents of outlying areas on single factories. It is also important to 
improve the accessibility to the regional employment centers from the outlying areas 
by extending the transport system. This would improve the chances of employment in 
high-poverty locations, in particular in Arab and ultra-orthodox Jewish settlements.
b. Families whose head of household is of working age, but has low earning 
ability.
Allowances constitute an important weapon in the battle against poverty among 
people with low earning ability. The size of the allowance must be such that it allows 
recipients to maintain a reasonable basic standard of living. The means tests should be 
improved, so that it effectively identifies those really in need.
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The level of the allowances, and linking them to changes  in the standard of 
living. The allowances should be adjusted according to the standard of living and 
changes in it, by indexing them to the median income or to the cost of essential 
needs.
Income and employment testing and their enforcement. A basic condition for 
the efficient operation of the proposed program, income and employment testing and 
their enforcement must be improved. The income test should cover income from 
all sources, including imputed income from living in owner-occupied housing and 
income in kind. Employment testing should be upgraded continuously in the light of 
experience gained from the Mehalev program.
c. The elderly
Compulsory employment insurance. This is a very important element in boosting 
the economic independence of (the future) elderly and reducing their dependence on 
transfer payments. A government decision of February 2007 specifies that all workers 
would be covered by a compulsory insurance scheme from 2010. The details of the 
arrangement have not as yet been finalized.
In order to reduce the adverse effect on workers’ current wage and to moderate the 
increase in the cost of labor, it is proposed to impose a ceiling on the wage that will 
require a deduction to be allocated to a pension fund. It is important that the ceiling be 
set at a level that in the long term, together with the old-age allowance, will enable a 
reasonable minimum standard of living to be maintained. In order to avoid reducing 
the current income of those earning very low wages even further, bearing in mind 
that they do not receive the tax benefits on pension savings as they are below the tax 
threshold, it is proposed that the cost of their insurance premium be subsidized.
d. Education
Enhancing the school and higher education system is a major tool in reducing poverty 
and preventing it from becoming permanent. This applies particularly to the weaker 
sections of the population which find it difficult to finance the additional educational 
services––over and above the public education––enjoyed by the economically better-
off sections of the population. Strengthening public education among poor children 
is an important aspect of helping them increase their future earning ability. Thus 
the educational resources allocated to students from low-income families should be 
increased. The steps proposed include increasing the premium paid to qualified teachers 
in weaker schools; rewarding teachers according to their students’ achievements; 
reducing the number of children in large classes, introducing the long school day, and 
extending the supply of hot meals in weak schools. Free pre-school-age education 
should be expanded in low socioeconomic areas. It is proposed that extra lessons 
be instituted in essential subjects such as English, mathematics and computers, to 
increase the students’ chances of employment in the future.
CHAPTER 8: ISSUES IN WELFARE POLICY
343
4. THE PUBLIC PHARMACEUTICALS BASKET––AN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE
 The public pharmaceutical basket in Israel is generous relative to those in the 
developed countries, but the private sector participates in financing the basket 
to a greater extent than in those countries.
 The process of including new medical technologies in the public basket is based 
not on a structural cost-effectiveness analysis but on the purely clinical aspect. 
As the resources available to the health system are limited, the activities of the 
health basket committee should be expanded to include a structural assessment 
of new technologies as a condition for their inclusion in the basket.
 The basket includes reserves that enable the Health Funds to provide such new 
technologies that are not part of the public basket.
Under the National Health Insurance Law, the state provides a pharmaceutical basket19 
for all residents of the country, regardless of their financial situation. Most developed 
countries provide such a pharmaceutical basket as part of their overall range of 
public services, but it is not necessarily uniform and available to all the citizens of 
any particular country. Since the resources available to the health system are limited, 
and the public basket does not enable it to include all the latest medical advances, 
most developed countries therefore adopt a structural cost-effectiveness analysis to 
assess new medical technologies intended for inclusion in the basket. Thus they make 
maximum use of the budget. In Israel, however, cost-effectiveness indices have not 
been used hitherto to assess the relation of the cost to the patient to the quality-adjusted 
contribution of the technology. The public basket in Israel is considered generous in 
comparison with those of the developed countries, and it incorporates very expensive 
life-prolonging medications not included in the public baskets of most countries. To 
ensure that the basket is exploited with the greatest efficiency, the use of quantitative 
measures to assess the economic contribution of new technologies should be extended. 
In that way only those technologies whose cost relative to the extra years they offer is 
shown to be effective will be included in the basket. For this purpose the activity of 
the health basket committee should be extended so that it operates throughout the year 
and performs such independent assessments.20 
19  According to the definitions generally accepted in the OECD, including use of medicines and medical 
equipment for use by households and those supplied in hospitals for individual use. The expenditure 
includes VAT and purchase taxes, but does not include pharmacists’ salaries. Source: based on OECD 
Health Data 2006 and Central Bureau of Statistics data.
20 Currently the committee meets once a year, prior to the approval of the budget, and it makes its 
decisions on the basis of information received from the drug companies. With the current composition of 
the committee and the shortage of manpower in the Medical Technologies Policy Division in the Ministry 
of Health, the committee is unable to perform worthwhileness tests on new technologies.
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a. The public health basket
Under the National Health Insurance Law which became effective in January 1995, 
the government undertook to make available a uniform pharmaceutical basket to every 
citizen of Israel entitled to receive it irrespective of his or her financial situation. The 
basket defined was that offered by the General Health Fund (Kupat Holim Klalit) 
prior to the Law coming into effect. The Law also specified that all the health funds 
had to offer the same basket of services. As well as defining the basket of health 
services which are the responsibility of the health funds (the Second Addendum to 
the Law), the Law defines another basket of services for which the Ministry of Health 
is responsible (the Third Addendum); this basket incorporates personal preventative 
medical services, psychiatric services, geriatric hospitalization, and rehabilitation 
equipment.
Israel is one of the only advanced economies in which the public basket of 
pharmaceuticals is uniform for all citizens. In countries in which the government is 
decentralized, such as Germany, Canada, Australia and the Scandinavian countries 
the local governments determine the contents of the health basket, so that residents of 
different locations are entitled to different standards of health care;21 in the US the list 
of medications is determined by the insurance companies and the Health Maintenance 
Organizations (HMOs). The wide differences between the health policies and methods 
of prescribing drugs in the industrialized countries makes comparing the extent of 
their health baskets problematic. One can, however, compare the process of assessing 
and adding new technologies to the basket.
b. Updating the basket to include technological advances
Since 1998 the law has defined a mechanism for an annual update of the public health 
basket within the context of a given budget allocated for that purpose, according to a 
decision taken jointly by the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Health and taking 
into account the needs and budgetary preferences. To carry out the update, a public 
committee was appointed, whose members included representatives of the Ministry 
of Health and the Ministry of Finance, of the four health funds, and of the public. 
The committee meets every year and discusses the list of new medical technological 
advances for possible inclusion in the basket on the basis of clinical criteria (safety, 
efficacy, and the medical benefit they offer) and social ones, such as the technology’s 
contribution to the patient’s quality of life and its appropriateness for special groups 
in the population. In this way the committee constructs a scale of priorities for the 
inclusion of new technologies in the basket within the budgetary limitations set by the 
government. The committee does not perform systematic cost-effectiveness analyses 
21 For example, in the north of the Netherlands only 6 percent of women who needed the drug Herceptin 
for the treatment of breast cancer received it, compared with 86 percent who received it in another 
location in the south of the country.
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to compare alternatives, with the result that Israel is a trail-blazer in the adoption of 
life-saving technologies.22
Since the committee was appointed in 1998, more than 400 medical technological 
advances have been included in the basket, at a total cost of about NIS 1.7 billion (Table 
8.6); about 60 percent of those added are related to the treatment of oncological and 
endocrinological diseases, and are very costly.23 For example, the cost of treatment for 
certain oncological diseases, for example the drugs Erbitux and Avastin for treating 
cancer of the colon, and Herceptin for treating breast cancer comes to many thousand 
shekel a month per patient. The cost of technologies used in the treatment of chronic 
states deriving from genetic diseases can reach millions of shekel a year for each 
patient.
Unlike the situation prevailing in Israel, where as stated the health basket committee 
does not take cost-effectiveness analysis into consideration and, where most additions 
to the basket consist of very costly life-prolonging technologies, the rise in expenditure 
on technological advances has led most of the industrialized countries to assess those 
under consideration for inclusion in the health basket by means of cost-effectiveness 
indices.24 The index usually used around the world is The COST/QUALY index, 
which gives the ratio of the cost to the patient (COST) to quality adjusted years of 
life of (QUAL) that the technology offers him.25 The body that assesses whether it 
is worth adding new technological advances to the public basket is also responsible 
for determining the budget for the update. Australia, in 1993, was the first country 
to decide that a drug would be included in the public health basket only after its cost 
effectiveness was determined. The assessment procedure there makes the addition of 
a new technology to the public basket conditional on the ability of the individual and 
the state to finance it. According to that rule, the state does not finance medications 
whose cost is very high, because they are not economically worthwhile, nor does it 
finance cheap ones, because patients can finance these by themselves. In the UK the 
assessment of medication and health services has been carried out since 1999 by the 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE). As in Australia, only 
technologies that meet the strict cost criteria are included in the basket. The assessment 
mechanisms in Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands are noteworthy for their severity, 
22  O. Tal, A. Nir, N. N. Hakak, E. Bakshi and G. Fire (2006). “Criteria for early adoption of medical 
technologies,” Gertner Institute for Epidemiology and Health Policy Research. This study examined the 
criteria for the adoption of new technologies and the dates when three innovative medical technologies, 
selected randomly, were adopted: Herceptin for treating breast cancer; photo-dynamic therapy using 
Verteporfin for the treatment of muscular dystrophy; and a coated stent used to hold open an artery that 
has become too narrow due to atherosclerosis. It found that in all three instances of new technologies, 
Israel was the first country to adopt them.
23  Source: A. Luxenburg (2005). “Issues in the Management and Updating of the Basket of Services,” 
in Ten Years with the National Health Insurance Law, 1995–2005, G. Ben-Nur and G. Ofer (eds) (in 
Hebrew). 
24  A survey carried out by the OECD in 2005 found that most of the developed countries used this 
method to assess whether it is worthwhile adding any new technology to the basket.
25  Dickson M., J. Hurst and S. Jacobzone (2003). “Survey of Pharmacoeconomic Assessment Activity 
in Eleven Countries,” OECD Health Working Paper 2003.04.
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which is aimed at halting the rise in the cost of medications by switching to generic 
drugs. In Canada the state finances only drugs that are administered in hospitals. 
Germany is considered to have the most generous basket of medication of all the 
advanced economies, but it is not available to the whole population.26 
One solution to the problem of the shortfall in the public health basket that is 
sometimes proposed in discussion is to legislate for a fixed update to the basket 
of 2 percent a year for technological advances; no such system exists anywhere in 
the world. Research into the relation between public expenditure on health and the 
business cycle in the developed countries found that this proposed system does not 
exist in any of them, and in all of them public expenditure on health is correlated with 
the business cycle:27 in periods of boom countries increase their health budgets, and 
in recessions they do not––some of them actually cut their health budgets in times of 
recession. Moreover, the proposed system of a fixed annual increase would reduce the 
government’s ability to adjust its fiscal policy according to changes in the business 
cycle and other requirements.
The public health basket also incorporates four hidden reserves that enable 
new technologies to be added, over and above the budgeted amount. The reserves 
derive from four sources: (1) adopting advanced technologies which reduce costs of 
treatment, without deducting the savings from the budgeted costs; (2) the lowering 
of drug prices when patents expire, without the budget being adjusted accordingly;28 
(3) technologies no longer used, that have not been removed from the basket; and (4) 
the arrangements for payment for drugs and services in the basket (a reserve of about 
26  In Germany the National Health Institute (NHI) covers the employed population and the total 
population that earns up to a maximum income. Eighty-eight percent of the population is covered by the 
national insurance.
27  Dreger, C., Reimers (2005), “Health Care Expenditures in OECD Countries: A Panel Unit Root 
and Cointegration Analysis,” International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies, 
Vol.2(2). This study examines the relation between per capita public expenditure on health and the 
business cycle in the 21 OECD countries in the years 1975–2001.
28  According to Ministry of Health data, when their patents expire, drug prices fall by about 30 percent 
on average in the first  year, and by 80 percent in the first three years.
Table 8.6
The Number of Technologies Submitted for Inclusion in the Basket, and the 
Number Confirmed, 1999–2006
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004a 2005 2006
Submitted 88 300 316 367 369 .. 429 400+
Confirmed 51 118 84 53 35 .. 61 65
Addition to health basket 
(NIS million, nominal) 150 270 200 190 20 40 370 310
a The basket committee did not meet in 2004. The addition to the basket, NIS 40 million, was decided 
in 2003. 
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NIS 250 million a year)––these arrangements enable the funds to charge patients for 
part of the cost (co-payment) according to the price that is listed in the Ministry of 
Health and not according to its actual cost. This latter is particularly notable in regard 
to generic drugs (which constitute some 75 percent of drugs prescribed), regarding 
which the patient’s contribution is exceptionally high in relation to their cost. These 
reserves enable the funds to provide drugs not included in the basket defined by the 
law.
c. Financing
National adjusted per capita pharmaceutical expenditure in Israel (purchasing power 
parity––PPP) in 2003 was close to the average in the developed countries, but the share 
financed privately in Israel is far higher than in those countries, 52 percent compared 
with 39 percent respectively. Only in the US, Canada, Mexico, Poland and Denmark 
was the share of private expenditure in total health expenditure higher than that in 
Israel.29 The cut in the health budget since 2001 reduced the public sector’s share in 
the financing of the basket, with an increase in the share of the private sector. In 2004 
households contributed 33 percent directly to the financing of the health basket.
29 In the Scandinavian countries and in Canada public expenditure includes only central government 
expenditure, and does not include the expenditure of the local authorities. Thus, actual public expenditure 
in those countries is higher than that referred to in the above comparison.
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